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Created: 2011/01/30 02:03:37 JSTLastUpdate:2020/07/07 03:44:55 JST
RUBRO POLITICA
TITULO Essays On Okinawa Problems (š)
AUTOR Masahide Ota
EDITORIAL Yui Publishing
ISBN 4-946539-10-7
IDIOMA INGLES
CODIGO INTERNO PL-0060
NOTA (š)(The Battle of Okinawa, the final campaign in the Pacific War, began in March 1945. I was a student at the Okinawa Normal School at that time. Students as well as teachers at our school were mobilized into the defense forces and sent to the front under the orders of the Commanding General of the Japanese 32nd Imperial Army. Male students of twelve high schools throughout Okinawa were ordered to form the LTekketsu Kinno TaiL, or LBlood and Iron CorpsL. And I was one of them. We were told to defend our homeland at all cost. As Ivan Morris, a British scholar of Japanese Studies, aptly says,LThe fortress of Okinawa now appeared to be the home islandLs only protection from (American) invasion, and its defense was the key to whether Japan would survive as an independent nationL. The Battle of Okinawa, or LThe Typhoon of SteelL as the Okinawans call it, almost ended on June 22, 1945 when the Japanese defense forcesL systematic resistance ceased. However it took another four months to mop up the campaign, and the terms of the Japanese forcesL unconditional surrender were officially signed by both U.S. and Japanese militaries at the 10th Army Headquarters at Kadena on September 7. During the Battle of Okinawa, Hanson W. Baldwin, a famous New York Times military historian, reported about the battle as follows : LIn retrospect, the battle for Okinawa can be described only in the grim superlatives of war. In size, scope and ferocity, it dwarfed the Battle of Britain. Never before had there been, probably never again will there be, such a vicious sprawling struggle of planes against planes, of ships against planes. Never before, in so short a space, had the Navy lost so many ships ; never before in land fighting had so much American blood been shed in so short a time in so small an area : probably never before in any three months of the war had the enemy suffered so hugely, and the final toll of American casualties was the highest experienced in any campaign against the Japanese. There have been larger land battles, more protracted air campaigns, but Okinawa was the largest combined operation, a Lno quarterL struggle fought on, under and over sea and land.L In this vicious battle, it was the Okinawan people who suffered the most. More than 140,000 inhabitants were killed. The vast majority were civilians caught helplessly between opposing armies. The number of civilian dead exceeded the military dead, accounting for almost one third of the islandLs entire population. Indeed, in the battle of Okinawa, the Okinawan people endured one of Lthe fiercest and ugliest campaignsL of modern times. So when I escaped death by a hairLs breadth, I asked myself,LWhat is a war for? Who and what are we defending from whom?L When Tokyo realized that the LOkinawan barrierL was utterly lost, the Emperor summoned his highest ministers of state and the military staff and suggested that the Army consider Lother meansL, such as asking intermission by third country, to bring about an end to the war. The Lhome islandsL must not suffer as Okinawa had suffered. Negotiations for surrender and peace had to be entered into quickly, before an assault upon Japan was made. Thus, George H. Kerr, the author of LOkinawa, The History of an Island PeopleL, contends : LOkinawans had no part in formulating JapanLs military policies which led to the Battle of Okinawa, and fewer than five thousand trained Okinawan conscripts took part. Nevertheless, the Okinawan people were forced to make a hideous sacrifice on JapanLs behalf.L He further argues : LFundamental LJapanese polityL does not hold Okinawa to be a vital part of the nationLs body ; it is expendable, under duress, if thereby the interests of the home islands can be served advantageously. The mystical Japanese sense of national identity centers in the home provinces, imperial domain (in theory, al least) since the dawn of history. Okinawa, a separate kingdom and a separate people, was annexed only in 1879. Put this bluntly, the Okinawans reject this thesis, and many Japanese are startled by it, but the records bears out such an interpretation.L Accordingly,LOkinawa has shared the fate of many frontier territories too small and poor to attract attention in times of peace, but doomed to rise to international prominence during crises among the world powers.L Kerr continues,LIt cannot escape, the consequences of wars and revolutions in larger states nearby ; the postwar LOkinawa problemL was produced by events set in train long ago by accidents of geography and history.L Pondering on these thoughts, I have frequently written essays and papers on the LOkinawa problem.L This volume is a compilation of these essays and papers. The G-8 Summit will be held from July 21 to 23, 2000 here in Okinawa. It is an opportunity for the Okinawan people to appeal to the world for the reduction and withdrawal of the huge U.S. military bases on this tiny island. I sincerely hope that the Summit will help realize the long cherished hopes and dreams of the Okinawan people.[from LPREFACEL]@ŸMasahide Ota, former governor of Okinawa, is a professor emeritus at the University of the Ryukyus, Okinawa. At present, he is a director of Ota Peace Research Institute at Naha. He was born in Okinawa in 1925. While a student of the Okinawa, he was drafted into the Japanese Imperial Army as a member of the LBlood and Iron Student corps (Tekketsu Kinnoutai)L organized just before the invasion of Okinawa by U.S. Forces on April 1, 1945. After the war, he went to Tokyo to attend Waseda University and graduated from the school in 1954. He then went to the United States as a scholarship student for advanced studies, receiving an MA degree in journalism from Syracuse University in New York in 1956. He has taught at the East-West Center, University of Hawaii, as a research associate (1973), and at Arizona State University as a Fulbright visiting scholar (1978). He writes many articles and more than sixty books about Okinawa, including LThe Battle of OkinawaL ; LTHE OKINAWA MIND (Okinawa no Kokoro)L ; LWHO ARE THE OKINAWAN ? (Okinawajin towa Nanika)L ; LTHE POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF MODERN OKINAWA (Okinawa no Seiji Kozo)L and LTHE CONCIOUSNESS OF THE OKINAWAN PEOPLE (Okinawa no Minshu Ishiki)L and more. @¥CONTENTS : CHAPTER 1.Re-Examining the History of the Battle of Okinawa^An Ill-prepared, Reckless War^Treating Okinawa as an Occupied Land^The LGround PreparationL Strategy^The Battle Forsaken from the Outset^The Spy Incidents^What the Battle of Okinawa Teaches Us Now^ CHAPTER 2.War Momories Die Hard On Okinawa War Wounds^War Wounds^The EmperorLs Message^The Poorest Prefecture^Growing Social Distance^Accusations^ CHAPTER 3.Social Consciousness in the Ryukyus^Island of Courtesy^Low Social Awareness^Rigid Social System^Overlapping Laws^No Freedom of Speech^Mass Poverty^Underdeveloped Communications^Publication of the LRyukyu ShimpoL^Jahana and Civil Rights^Newspaper Feuds^Consciousness of Discrimination^Reactions to Discrimination^Okinawan Pessimism^Neglect of Local Customs^Enhancement of Political Consciousness^ CHAPTER 4.Okinawa : A North-South Problem Within Japan^Problems of the Land Used by U.S. Forces^LBase EconomyL -Heavy Local Dependence^Peace-Loving Nation in Spite of Military Pressure^The War, Sacrifice, and Tragedy^Continued Exploitation to Save Mainland Japan^ CHAPTER 5.The American Occupation of Okinawa and Postwar Reforms in Mainland Japan^Okinawa as Military Base and the Start of the American Military Government^Planning OkinawaLs Occupation^The Establishment of the U.S. Military Government^Changes in Okinawan Views of the United States^OkinawaLs Detachment and Postwar Policy Toward Japan^Conclusion^ CHAPTER 6.At the Supreme Court of Japan As the Governor of Okinawa^The Impact of the U.S. Military Bases^Origins of Forced Acquisition of Land^Land Acquisition by the American Military^The GovernmentLs Promises and PeopleLs Expectations^Nothing Has Changed^I Demand, Request, Wish...^ CHAPTER 7.Why CanLt We Reduce the U.S. Military Presence On Okinawa?^The Process of U.S. Military Bases Construction and the Current Situation in Okinawa^Burden of the Military Bases in Okinawa^The History of Okinawa and Mainland Japan^The Central GovernmentLs Recent Policies Toward Okinawa^AmericaLs View of Okinawa^Reduction of the U.S. Military Bases^Post-Return Economy^What We Ask of the United States of America^ CHAPTER 8.Speech to the American Congressional Study Group On Japan^)

   

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